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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
LORIN R. FARNSWORTH, father of
Matt Robert Farnsworth, deceased,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
O F U T A H , ARCHITECTURAL
BUILDING SUPPLY, THE STATE
INSURANCE FUND, and THE SECOND INJURY FUND OF THE
STATE OF UTAH,
Defendants.

Case No.
13910

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Upon the death of Matt Robert Farnsworth, the
plaintiff herein, Lorin R. Farnsworth, father of the deceased, filed a claim with the Industrial Commission of
Utah requesting funds allegedly due him for his partial
dependency on his son under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
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DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
After a hearing on the claim presented by the plaintiff, Lorin R. Farnsworth, the Industrial Commission of
Utah entered an order denying plaintiff the benefits requested for his dependency on the deceased. The Commission found that the plaintiff, under the circumstances
of this case was not entitled to the benefits.
Upon the filing of a Motion to Review, the entire
Commission reviewed the grounds for granting said motion and itself ordered that the dependency shown by
the facts of the case was not that which is contemplated
and intended within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act. With said order, the Motion for Review
was denied.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the Hearing Examiner's findings and affirmation of the Industrial Commission's order that the dependency shown was not that
intended under the Workmen's Compensation Act and
that said benefits requested by the plaintiff be denied.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent agrees substantially with the facts
as set forth by the plaintiff but makes the following additions and corrections:
1. While the deceased was in high school, he worked
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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for Egbert Parking Service as a part-time employee. He
often worked split shifts upwards of 12 hours per day
(R. 28). Though this lengthy shift work was not consistent, he would consistently work at least 20-25 hours
per week in addition to going to high school (R. 28).
2. Though Matt Robert Farnsworth was employed
during high school and after graduation, he continued to
reside at home, eat meals at home, and share the benefits of the family unit as he was accustomed to (R. 34).
He retained all income from his jobs and did not contribute any such funds to his parents for room or board,
etc. (R. 34).
3. Appellant testified at the hearing that the deceased was reimbursed for gas used in deceased's car
when said car was used for transporting him (R. 41).
Further, appellant testified that the main reason he paid
bills in person was to get outside and to simply go
somewhere (R, 38). Further, he testified that his boys
and "my wife" would read mail to him (R. 46).
4. Appellant's mother died several months before
the hearing and appellant took care of her house because
he had not decided what to do with it — whether to sell
it or rent it (R. 37). All indications in the testimony indicated no need for the extensive care.
5. Mark Farnsworth testified that he was able to
accomplish all that the deceased brother had (R. 60).
Even though unemployed at the time, he testified his
services were worth $500, the same amount requested
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by his father in his application (R. 58). Mark further
testified that part of the time he would spend in helping
his father would be working on cars (R. 57). The appellant, wife, and son Mark at that time had 6 cars and two
trucks (R. 60); and that before the death of Matt, he
had spent approximately one hour a day in behalf of his
father (R. 57).
6. The appellant indicated without reservation that
Matt would do the watering, mowing and odd jobs around
appellant's mother's home, but that if it needed painting,
he would pay someone else to do the work.
7. The deceased was working full time and only
earning approximately $400 per month (R. 26, 27), whereas the appellant claims that the services of the son of
approximately 2% hours per day (R. 39) or 15 or so hours
a week at most is worth $500, $100 more than he made
in gainful employment. Also, the record is clear that since
Matt was working for Architectural Supply, extended
journeys were taken by the deceased (e.g., the trip to
Idaho Falls when he was killed) which would show his
inability to do all he had done before (R. 6).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THERE WAS NO SHOWING OF ABUSE ON
THE PART OF THE HEARING EXAMINER
OR THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION IN
RULING AGAINST THE APPELLANT; AND
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AS SUCH THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSION MUST BE AFFIRMED.
In Rigby v. Industrial Commission, 75 Utah 454, 286
P. 628 (1930), cited by the plaintiff in support of his
position, this court said:
Whether one person is dependent upon another within the meaning of the Workmen's
Compensation Act is primarily a question of fact.
It is the exclusive province of the Industrial
Commission to determine the facts and to draw
legitimate inferences therefrom. It is also, in
the first instance, the province of the Commission to determine from such facets and inferences whether dependency does or does not exist. When, however, the established facts and
inferences reasonably deducible therefrom can
lead to but one conclusion, a question of law is
presented which this court, upon property application, must review. (Emphasis added.)
This court further expressed the powers it has in
such cases in Combined Metals Reduction Co. v. Industrial Commission, 74 Utah 247, 278 P. 1019 (1929). There,
the court said:
The power of this court to review an award
made by the Industrial Commission "shall not
be extended further than to deterniine whether
or not: 1. The commission acted without or in
excess of its powers. 2. If findings of fact are
made, whether or not such findings of feet support the award under review.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
These cases clearly show the state of the law regarding the Commission's findings. The record contains more
than ample evidence and testimony to establish that the
hearing examiner's decision and the later holding of the
Commission was not against the weight of evidence "as
a matter of law." Further, Rigby holds that only when
one decision could have been reached (from the evidence)
and was not, the Supreme Court had grounds to intervene in reversal. Such is not the case at bar, for the
facts support a legitimate contest based on the Commission's interpretation of the evidence.
Not only did the hearing examiner state in his findings of fact and conclusion of law that the evidence was
clearly against the position of the plaintiff, but the Industrial Cosmission also stated in its denial of Motion for
Review (R. 96) that:
. . . the Commission has reviewed the file
and memorandums contained therein, and we
are of the opinion that the motion for review
should be denied. It is our judgment that although the applicant may have been dependent
upon the deceased for certain activities, the dependency as expressed by the evidence is not
one that was contemplated within the meaning
of the Workmen's Compensation Act. (Emphasis added.)
Therefore, it is evidence from the foregoing that the
evidence interpreted by the Commission and Hearing
Examiner led to the denial of relief. Since this evidence
was weighed carefully with the plaintiff herein arguing
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vigorously for his position, the decision affirmed by the
Industrial Commission must be affirmed by this court.
POINT II.
APPELLANT WAS NOT PARTIALLY DEP E N D E N T ON THE DECEASED SON
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT.
As correctly cited by the Appellant in his brief, there
is no presumption of dependency in a case such as the
persent action. Utah Code Annotated 35-1-71 (1953)
simply states that for dependencies other than that of
the wife and children on the deceased husband, the facts
of the case will determine whether dependency exists.
It must be realized that whether a parent is well or
handicapped — as is the appellant herein — children
have certain obligations or duties to perform "for the
family unit." Naturally, it varies from family to family
what extent such responsibilities are imposed. Simply
because the appellant needs help in doing many things
does not by itself mean that the State Insurance Fund
proceeds should be paid to him. The purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act was not to enrich those who
didn't need or didn't qualify for help, but to make it
possible for individuals who were "dependent" on the
injured worker to provide for certain things in life which
would enable them to carry on in light of the injuries
involved. Since statutory language, as well as court decision, dictates that individual case facts be weighed to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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decide dependency, the facte, as interpreted by the Commission, must prevail unless they are clearly to the contrary.
Appellant cites several cases purporting support for
his position. A close analysis of them reveals that they
are diametrically opposed to the situation within which
appellant finds himself. Daly Mining Company v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 67 Utah 483, 248 P. 125
(1926), did establish that direct financial support need
not exist for there to be dependency under the act, as
appellant recites. In Daly, however, the son's help was
found necessary to the plaintiff therein, thereby making
it possible for the father to make the farm involved productive and to make payments on the mortgage. The
court analyzed the situation as follows:
• . . the evidence is nevertheless clear that
he helped to support the family, and that the
applicant, to some extent at least, was dependent upon and relied on the assistance of deceased in developing and paying for the land
upon which the family lived. The evidence is
also sudh that the Commission was justified in
inferring that deceased, had he continued to live,
would have continued to assist the applicant in
paying for the land and in developing the same
so as to make it productive in the future.
Appellant bases his claim on the fact that he was
supported or helped by the deceased, thus making him
dependent on his son. Had the appellant relied on Matt's
help for payment on the mortgage, purchasing of food
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and payment of medical bills, etc., then Daly, id., would
control. Everything contributed by the deceased son,
however, had no direct relationship to necessary activities as expressed in Daly. The Appellant even testified
that the reason he paid his bills in person — having his
son take him — was to get outside and away from home
(R. 38). This is purely a personal desire which has no
apparent basis for "dependency status." The record as
set forth in the statement of facts of both briefs is full
of situations where the son was not required to perform
the functions done, but did so to help his father out.
Mowing grass, yard work, watering (R. 30) are performed
by children of most families. Nothing in the record indicates that this is unique to the appellant. Reading mail
and magazines perhaps increases the aesthetic value of
the day, but is not all inclusive that a dependency worth
compensation exists.
Rigby v. Industrial Commission, supra, set forth
several criteria upon which cases of dependency must be
measured. The appellant's claim must be viewed in light
of this Supreme Court directive:
To entitle plaintiff to compensation in this
case, it must affirmatively be made to appear
that at the time of the injury (1) plaintiff relied upon his son, in whole or in part, for his
support and maintenance; (2) that had the son
not been killed plaintiff would in all probability
have received some assistance from his son; (3)
that it was reasonably necessary for the son to
render his father some financial aid in order that
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the father might continue to live in a condition
suitable and becoming to his station in life.
Viewed in light of this test, appellant's claim fails
to meet the requirements of dependency. The first criteria is "support and maintenance." There is no evidence
in the record that the son supported or maintained the
parents — the father — in any degree other than acts
done to enable the father to care for his personal needs
(doctor appointments) or self chosen assignment (caring
for his mother's home for several months). The facts
establish that the son, though working, was given room
and board (R. 95), that the son was reimbursed for gas
used in driving the plaintiff around (R. 41), that the
plaintiff would not imposed on his son unduly for such
things as painting which he would pay someone else to
do (R. 47), that the deceased son retained all wages he
eamed (R. 34). The feet that the family had 6 cars and
two trucks (R. 60) which needed "looking after" indicates
that there was no necessity of having the son "work on
cars," but that it was a family project to have them —
much like a hobby. It is, therefore, clear that the plaintiff fails to meet the first requirement of Rigby.
As to the second requirement, the testimony given
could well be interpreted to establish that the deceased
would have continued helping his father in some degree
had he not died, although there was a question as to how
much help that would be. The deceased was engaged
(R. 34), had discussed the help with his fiancee (R. 34)
and had come to some agreement with her that some
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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help would be continued. The fact that he had just
begun a new full-time job with Architectural Building
Supply and was required to travel to places such as
Idaho Falls (R. 6) all add to the inference that the help
would diminish. Nevertheless, the facte could be read
to fulfill requirement two.
Regarding the third criteria, the appellant's action
totally fails to satisfy it. Even though Daly, supra, refers
to non-financial aid, there must be some showing that
whatever was offered to the appellant by the son was
"reasonably necessary" for the father to manage in his
"station of life." The loss of a family member does not
change the "station of life," per se. Such tenninology
refers to the economic, social, and material plateaus. As
expressed earlier, that which the deceased did for plaintiff was not based on such necessities. With benefits of
nearly $800 per month (R. 25), which were directed solely
to the appellant, and the fact that appellant's wife worked
full time (R. 32) indicates that the station in life would
permit the expenditure of funds for transportation for
the activties so conducted by the deceased without affecting this "position." The fact that the appellant reimbursed for gas (R. 41) and would pay others to do painting jobs (R. 47) expressly confirm this analysis.
In Roller Coaster Co. v. Industrial Commission, 112
Utah 532, 189 P. 2d 709 (1948), cited by appellant, the
Commission found that the deceased contributed about
25% of the total family maintenance costs. "That his
mother and half-sister were in dire need of his assistance

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
is obvious," said the court. More important in the case,
however, is the holding the court gave regarding this "station in life" proposition:
Ogden City v. Industrial Commission, 57
Utah 221, 193 P. 857; Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 67 Utah 25, 245 P. 381, 45
A. L. R. 882; John Scowcroft & Sons Co. v. Industrial Commission, [70 Utah 116], 258 P. 339.
It is there, in effect, held that compensation
should be founded upon the probable financial
loss suffered by the dependents on account of
the death of the decedent...
Though the plaintiff cites Ogden City, supra, to support liberal construction for the workman's dependents,
such liberality, as pointed out above, depends on need and
financial loss suffered. Neither of these prerequisites
have been shown or proven by the appellant.
The respondent, therefore, submits that, based on
the foregoing analysis, the Commission's finding that the
dependency in this case was not that which was contemplated under the acts should be affirmed.
POINT III.
BECAUSE OF THE FUNDS AVAILABLE
TO HIM, THE APPELLANT WAS NOT DEP E N D E N T ON THE DECEASED FOR
MAINTENANCE IN HIS STATION OF LIFE.
As indicated in Point II, this court has consistently
referred to "station in life" as a focal point of analysis.
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Such a position is based on economic, social, and material
requirements of life. Hancock v. Industrial Commission,
58 Utah 197, 198 P. 169 (1921), quoted an earlier Delaware case regarding the test of dependency. The court
quoted as follows:
It is not sufficient that the contributions of
the employe were used ajn paying the living expenses of the claimant, but it must be shown
that the contributions of the employe were relied
upon by the dependent for his or her means of
living judging this by the class and position of
life of the dependent. . . .
However, the test of dependency, generally
speaking, is whether the claimant relied upon the
employe's contributions for his support wholly
or partially judging this by what would be reasonable living expenses for persons in the same
class and position. Support as used within the
meaning of the statute is of a broader import
than food, clothing and shelter, and may include
all such means of living as would enable the
claimant to live in a style and condition and with
a degree of comfort suitable and becoming to his
station in life. (Emphasis added.)
Contrary to what the appellant alleges, this case, as
well as Rigby, supra, point out that the mere feet that
the necessities are not contributed to by the deceased is
not of itself sufficient to deny relief, but that some visible,
actual support need be given to help the appellant maintain his position.
The only support of appellant's contention is the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
statements made in appellant's brief that the deceased
did "acts" which helped the appellant. It is not shown
that any of these acts helped the appellant "maintain"
his position in life. As pointed out previously, the appellant reimbursed the deceased for travel. To pay for
or require someone else to do the same acts would not
change the "station" in life or reduce appellant's standard
of living. There would be no significant change in finances
or custom — merely the change of a new person doing
those acts.
As quoted by the appellant in his brief, Utah Galena
Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 78 Utah 492, 5 P. 2d 242
(1931), said:
It follows that dependency does not depend
on whether the alleged dependents could support
themselves without decedent's earnings, or so
reduce their expenses, so that they would be
supported independent of his earnings, but on
whether they were in fact supported in whole or
in part by such earnings, under circumstances indicating an intent on the part of the deceased to
furnish such support. (Emphasis added.)
Thus, from appellant's own argument, it is clear that his
contention regarding "necessities of life" does not control
this case. The record contains no fact that even hints
that the deceased contributed any earnings to the appellant. On the contrary, it is clear from appellant's own
testimony that they had agreed that the deceased not
pay anything (R. 34). Therefore, Utah Galenda, id., con-
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trols to affirm the Commission's decision since appellant
was not "supported in whole or in part by such earnings."
The record is clear that appellant had more than
adequate funds to provide for himself, his family, and
even his mother's home. The cases cited by appellant
refer to "necessities/' They do not, however, go as far
as the appellant proposes. The cases raise a presumption
that if the deceased helps contribute to the "necessities",
the individual is dependent. The evidence of this case
shows that any presumption of dependency beyond that
point is rebutted, thus affirming the holding of the Industrial Commission.
The appellant was not dependent on the deceased
for the necessities of life, and he was not dependent on
the deceased within the meaning of this court's position
of maintenance in his "station in life." The decision of
the Hearing Examiner and Commission should therefore,
be affirmed.
POINT IV.
DEPENDENCY STATUS AT TIME OF
DEATH DICTATES THAT THE APPELLANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF HE REQUESTED.
Utah Code Annotated 35-1-71 provides that the question of dependency be determined in accordance "with
tiie facts in each particular case existing at the time of
the injury resulting in the death of the employee."
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Appellant argues that it is not germane to this case
that Mark Famsworth is now performing the functions
of his deceased brother. It is a fact that the deceased
was contemplating marriage (R. 34) and that he would
not be able to carry on with all the activities he had done
before marriage (R. 34). It is further a fact that at the
time of death, the deceased's other brother was performing services for the father (R. 56-7) and would continue
to be home.
These facts were in existence at the time of Matt's
death. To say that these facts should be "excluded" from
being important to the issue of dependency is to outwardly reject the language of the statute upon which
appellant bases his contention.
Can it reasonably be conceived that if parties have
plans for the future and one dies in the meantime that
those plans are to be disregarded in determining dependency? The respondent contends that the record gives
ample supportive evidence for the Commission to decide
that at the time of death the parties involved had contemplated future contingencies due to the upcoming marriage of the deceased and that such evidence mandated
the decision given.
CONCLUSION
As has been evidenced by the analysis preceding,
there was no abuse of discretion by either the hearing
examiner of the Industrial Commission in reaching the
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decision appealed from. That decision was based on the
evidence and testimony given.
The dependency claimed did not fall in the confines
of the Workmen's Compensation Act, since the deceased
contributed only aesthetic and family help, did not contribute financially, and the appellant's station in life was
not changed. The facts at the time of death support this
position.
Therefore, the respondent respectfully submits to
this court that the decision appealed from should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
FRANK V. NELSON
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant, The
Second Injury Fund of the
State of Utah

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RECEIVED
LAW. LIBRARY
DEC 6

1975

BRIGMAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY
J . Reuben Clark Law School

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

